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RACKETEER INFLUENCE AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
ACT-CIVIL RICO: STATING A CLAIM IN NORTH DAKOTA
Rolin Mfg., Inc. v. Mosbrucker, 544 N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1996)
I. FACTS
In 1992, Rolin Manufacturing, Inc. (Rolin Manufacturing), a New
Salem, North Dakota manufacturing company, filed a complaint against
Jim Mosbrucker, a Mandan, North Dakota farmer and rodeo operator,
and Bank Center First (the Bank).' The complaint alleged that on
January 21, 1992, Mosbrucker paid Rolin Manufacturing with three
checks drawn on his account at the Bank for a trailer and work done on
rodeo equipment. 2 Rolin Manufacturing agreed to hold the checks for
payment until after two rodeos, when Mosbrucker promised he would
have money in the account to cover them. 3 When Rolin Manufacturing
presented the checks, they were returned for nonsufficient funds. 4
After discovery, Rolin Manufacturing amended their complaint,
claiming Mosbrucker had violated North Dakota's Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations 5 (RICO) statute by illegally controlling or
conducting a criminal enterprise, thus entitling Rolin Manufacturing to
treble damages and attorneys' fees. 6 During discovery, Rolin Manufacturing had found that Mosbrucker not only had a history of financial
problems, but also that his current financial situation was "hopeless." 7
1. See Appellee Bank Center First's Reply Brief at 2, Rolin Mfg., Inc. v. Mosbrucker, 544
N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1996) (No. 95-0107).
2. Rolin Mfg., Inc. v. Mosbrucker, 544 N.W.2d 132, 134 (N.D. 1996). The checks were in the
amount of $5,000.00, $3,396.75, and $3,396.75. Id. The $5,000.00 check was eventually paid, but the
lawsuit continued based on the two remaining checks. Id. at 134 n. 1.
3. See Appellant's Brief at 7, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
4. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 134. Rolin Manufacturing presented the checks for payment
before Mosbrucker's rodeos occurred. Appellee Bank Center First's Reply Brief at 1, Rolin Mfg. (No.
95-0107). Rolin Manufacturing also presented the checks to the Bank on several occasions after that,
but each time the checks were returned for nonsufficient funds. Id.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01 (Supp. 1995). North Dakota's Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute allows a plaintiff to recover treble damages and costs of the suit
for injury caused by a pattern of racketeering activity. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-05(d), (e)
(Supp. 1995). A pattern of racketeering activity requires the commission of two predicate criminal
acts. See id. § 12.1-06.1-01(d).
6. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 135. Rolin Manufacturing also alleged that Mosbrucker was
liable for the amounts of the two outstanding checks and had committed deceit. See id. at 136.
7. Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107). In conducting discovery, Rolin Manufacturing's attorney was fined $250 for misuse of a subpoena duces tecum when Rolin Manufacturing
issued a subpoena to the Bank without notice to Mosbrucker. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 139. Despite
this setback, Rolin Manufacturing went on to discover that Mosbrucker had failed to disclose that he
was a Chapter 12 debtor. Id. at 134. Further, Rolin Manufacturing found that Mosbrucker's liabilities
totaled nearly $900,000 while his disposable income was only expected to be $11,610, and that
Mosbrucker knew it would be impossible to comply with the Chapter 12 plan and pay Rolin
Manufacturing's checks. See id. at 136.

742

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:741

Rolin Manufacturing alleged that in the year and two months before
Mosbrucker had written the three checks, 115 of his checks had been
returned by the Bank for nonsufficient funds and another 619 overdrafts
were honored by the Bank, which led to $8,357 in overdraft fees. 8
Furthermore, from January through May of 1993, Mosbrucker issued an
additional 31 nonsufficient funds checks and 687 overdrafts, which
resulted in another $10,635 in overdraft fees. 9 Rolin Manufacturing
claimed Mosbrucker's actions constituted a pattern of racketeering and
that Mosbrucker had "illegally controlled or conducted a criminal
enterprise, especially one fed and supported by his pattern of NSF and
overdraft checks."l0
In addition to Mosbrucker's financial woes, Rolin Manufacturing
also learned Mosbrucker had judgments entered against him for conversion, which Rolin Manufacturing claimed constituted the crime of theft
and established a predicate act under RICO.II Rolin Manufacturing
further asserted that while the trailer and rodeo equipment were in their
possession, they had a perfected security interest in the items. 1 2 Thus,
when Mosbrucker induced Rolin Manufacturing to give up possession of
these items by giving Rolin Manufacturing the bad checks, Mosbrucker
defrauded a secured creditor, a second predicate act. 13
Rolin Manufacturing's amended complaint also added the Bank as
a defendant and claimed that the Bank also violated RICO.14 The Bank
was a bankruptcy creditor in one of Mosbrucker's Chapter 12 actions
and had allowed Mosbrucker to accumulate over $18,000 in overdraft
fees.1 5 Because of the inevitable knowledgethe Bank's officers and
employees had to have, Rolin Manufacturing alleged that the actions of
the Bank constituted a combination described in the RICO statute.16
On May 3, 1994, the trial court granted the Bank's motion to
dismiss and awarded costs of $50 and fees of $1000 after finding the
8. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 135.
9. Id.
10. Amended Complaint at 39, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
11. See Appellant's Brief at 9, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
12. Amended Complaint at 30, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
13. See Appellant's Brief at 17, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
14. See Amended Complaint at 1 40, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107). Rolin Manufacturing also
claimed the Bank had been negligent in allowing Mosbrucker's account to remain open and had acted
as a partner by estoppel with Mosbrucker. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 136, 137. Partnership by
estoppel was the term used under North Dakota law describing the situation where a person represents
themselves as a partner when in fact they are not. N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-06-08 (Supp. 1995). The
partnership by estoppel statute was repealed effective January 1, 1997, but a similar statute appears in
section 45-15-08 of the North Dakota Century Code, which became effective on January 1, 1996. Id.
15. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 135.
16. Amended Complaint at 40, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
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amended complaint to be frivolous.1 7 On January 27, 1995, the complaint against Mosbrucker was also dismissed.1 8 The issues on appeal
were whether the dismissals and awards of fees were proper.1 9 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded,
holding that a claim was stated against Mosbrucker, that no claim had
been stated against the Bank, and that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in awarding fees and costs and in imposing sanctions. 20
Although Rolin Manufacturing, Inc. v. Mosbrucker contained
several issues, this comment will focus on the civil RICO claim because it
is an issue of first impression in North Dakota. Rolin Manufacturing is
the first case explaining what is required to state a claim under the North
Dakota RICO statute. 2 1
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as an attempt to eradicate organized crime by providing
more legal tools for gathering evidence, establishing new penal prohibitions, and enhancing sanctions and remedies for dealing with
organized crime. 2 2 Soon after, many state legislatures passed their own
RICO statutes patterned after the federal statute. 2 3 Because of the
similarities to the federal law, some state courts look to federal precedent
17. Appellant's Brief at 5, Rolin Mfg. (No. 95-0107).
18. Id. at 5-6. In his three line order, the judge stated it was "time for the crusade and vendetta
to end." Order, Rolin Mfg. (95-0107) app. at 38.
19. See Appellant's Brief at 6, Rolin Mfg. (95-0107).
20. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 139. The scope of this comment is limited to the RICO claims
alleged against the Bank and Mosbrucker although Rolin Manufacturing alleged several other claims
against each. See id. at 135.
21. See id. at 138.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) (referring to § 906 of Title V., Pub. L. No. 91-452, which is the
Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose). Congress also provided that the statute should be
liberally construed to effect its remedial purpose. Id.
23. Several states have enacted RICO statutes that allow for civil recovery. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-2314 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.1 to .6 (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-17-106 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-393 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II §
1505 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-6 (Harrison 1994); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 842-8 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7805 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-1 (Michie
1986); LA. REV. STAT. A NN. § 15:1356 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.911 (1994); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-43-9 (6) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 41-4 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-6
(Michie Repl. Pamphlet 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.34 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1409 (West Supp. 1996); 23 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 911 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
7-15-4(c) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-206 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605 (1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.100 (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.87 (West 1996).
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in interpreting their state statutes. 24 Thus, in tracing the requirements of
stating a RICO claim in North Dakota, it is helpful to begin with federal
court precedent, including the guidance provided by the United States

Supreme Court. 2 5 Next, it is useful to examine the pleading requirements under other states' RICO statutes which are similar to North
Dakota's statute. 2 6 Finally, the North Dakota statute itself will be
discussed.
A.

STATING A CLAIM UNDER CIVIL

Rico

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1961, the Federal RICO Statute
The federal RICO statute makes it unlawful for any person who has
received income from a pattern of racketeering activity to use such
income in any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. 27 RICO also
prohibits a person from using a pattern of racketeering activity to
control an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. 2 8 Furthermore, it
is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with an enterprise
to conduct its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 29
Finally, it is unlawful to conspire to violate the statute. 30 Any person
injured by a violation of § 1962 can recover treble damages and the cost
3
of the suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 1
Under the federal law, a pattern of racketeering requires the commission of at least two acts of racketeering activity, called predicate acts, one
of which must occur after the effective date of the statute and the last of
24. See, e.g., Grove Holding v. First Wis. Nat. Bank, 803 F. Supp. 1486, 1503 (E.D. Wis. 1992)
(stating that requirements under the federal law will apply unless the legislature has expressly chosen
an alternative); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F. Supp. 92, 99 (D. Or. 1985) (stating an intent to
interpret Oregon's statute in the same way the federal statute is interpreted); Rosier v. First Fin. Capital
Corp., 889 P.2d 11, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (stating because Arizona's statute so closely resembles
the federal statute, the legislature intended for it to have similar requirements).
25. The North Dakota Supreme Court has explained that when the legislature adopts a federal
statute it can be presumed that the legislature intended to accomplish the same purposes and objectives
as Congress. State v. Wells, 276 N.W.2d 679, 691 (N.D. 1979). Where such a statute has already
been construed by the federal court systems, it is also presumed that the legislature adopted any
construction the federal courts placed on the statute. Id. Finally, if the statute had not been interpreted
by the federal courts before the legislature adopted it, subsequent interpretation by federal courts will
not be controlling, but may be persuasive. Id.
26. See J.P. Furlong Enter., Inc., v. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 138 n.27 (N.D. 1988)
(noting that consideration of similar statutes of other states and the court decisions interpreting them is
appropriate and relevant).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
28. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1994). A violation of this subsection also requires that the enterprise
affect interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
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which must have occurred within ten years. 3 2 Racketeering activity
includes "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in a controlled substance ...

chargeable under State law and punishable

by imprisonment for more than one year." 33 An enterprise is defined as
any individual, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity, as well as
any group of individuals associated in fact even if they are not a legal
entity. 34
The Supreme Court has interpreted federal RICO on several occasions, emphasizing its broad scope, 3 5 holding that it reaches beyond
organized crime to both legitimate and illegitimate businesses, 3 6 and
finding that it is not necessary for the racketeering activity to be
motivated by an economic purpose. 3 7 The Court has also required a
showing by the plaintiff that the injury complained of be proximately
caused by the violation of the statute. 3 8 More specifically, the Court has
40
39
clarified the definitions of both pattern and enterprise.

2.

'Pattern' as defined by the Supreme Court

In Sedima v. Imrex Co.,4 1 the Supreme Court first tackled the issue
of what Congress meant by a "pattern of racketeering activity." 42 The
Court noted that a pattern may require more than a simple allegation of
two predicate acts. 4 3 Quoting a Senate report, the Court noted that
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
33. id. Racketeering activity also includes many other acts which are indictable under certain
other federal laws. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)(1994).
35. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (stating "RICO is to be read broadly").
36. See id. at 499.
37. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994).
38. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). Proximate
cause, rather than "but for" causation, is appropriate because: (1) the less direct the injury, the harder
it is to prove how much of the plaintiffs damages are attributable to it; (2) if claims were allowed for
indirect injuries, courts would have to use complicated rules to distribute damages among plaintiffs;
and (3) plaintiffs who were directly injured will likely bring claims to vindicate the law which makes
the need to help those injured more remotely less compelling. Id. at 269-70.
39. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989); Sedima, 473 U.S.
at 497.
40. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993).
41. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
42. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n. 14. Sedima is also important for its finding that it is not necessary
to show a prior conviction to recover civil damages. See id. at 493. The Court does not answer the
question of the standard of proof required for the predicate acts, but states that it does not believe it is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 491. Also, the Court settled in the negative the argument
among the circuits about whether a plaintiff needed to allege a separate "racketeering injury." See id.
at 495.
6
43. Id. at 49 n. 14.
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RICO's target was not sporadic activity and recognized that a pattern
44
would require "continuity plus relationship."
Four years later, the Court ruled squarely on this issue in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 45 In H.J. Inc., the Court interpreted §
1961(5) as merely setting the minimum number of predicate acts
required to show a pattern. 4 6 What emerged from H.J. Inc. was a two
pronged requirement for establishing a pattern: first, the predicate acts
must be related; and second, the acts must amount to a threat of continued criminal activity. 4 7 To show relatedness, the Court looked to the
Organized Crime Control Act, 48 which defines a pattern as "criminal acts
that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events." 49 The continuity requirement is basically a temporal concept which can be demonstrated by prov50
ing a series of related predicate acts over a substantial period of time.
3. Enterprise
If a plaintiff seeks to recover in a civil action under RICO, the
plaintiff must establish that the defendant substantively violated the
RICO statute by committing one of the prohibited activities and that she
or he was injured by defendant's conduct. 5 1 Conducting an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering is one such prohibited activity. 52 In
pleading a violation involving an enterprise, the plaintiff must show
several things, including "1) conduct 2) of an enterprise 3) through a
pattern 4) of racketeering activity." 53
The Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young54 resolved the meaning of the phrase "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of an enterprise's affairs." 5 5 The Court defined conduct as
leading, running, managing, or directing, and defined participate as to
44. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-617, at 158 (1969)).
45. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
46. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989).
47. See id. at 239. The Court noted the two prongs must be stated separately, though in practice
proof of the two will often overlap. Id.
48. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
49. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (quoting from Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2516)).
50. Id. at 242. Predicate acts occurring over a few weeks or months that pose no threat of future
criminal conduct will not satisfy the continuity requirement. Id.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
53. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
54. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
55. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
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take part in. 56 Looking at the two in context, the Court concluded that
the phrase requires the defendant to have some part in directing the
enterprise's affairs. 57 This construction led the Court to adopt the
operation or management test, which determines liability based on
whether the person has participated in the "operation or management of
58
the enterprise itself."
In conclusion, for a plaintiff to properly plead a civil RICO claim,
she or he must allege injury as a result of a violation of § 196259 and
that the injury was proximately caused by the violation. 60 In establishing
a pattern of racketeering activity, the plaintiff must allege at least two
predicate acts and show both relatedness between the two and a
likelihood of continued criminal activity. 6 1 If the plaintiff is alleging
unlawful control of an enterprise, she or he must allege participation in
the enterprise by the defendant, using the operation or management test
62
as a framework for establishing the necessary facts.
4. Stating a Claim in Federal Court
Though the Supreme Court has offered guidance in interpreting the
statute, the circuit courts continue to refine the pleading requirements of
RICO.63 More specifically, the circuit courts require that civil RICO
claims be pled with particularity, 64 and that the enterprise be shown to be
56. See id. at 177-79.
57. Id. at 179.
58. Id. at 183. Thus liability is not limited to upper management, since the enterprise will be
operated by lower rung participants as well. Id. at 184.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994). It is also a violation of the statute to acquire control of an enterprise
through the collection of an unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
60. See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
61. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
62. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 183.
63. Albert D. Spalding, Jr., How to Start a Civil RICO Lawsuit, PRAc. LAW., Oct. 1992, at 75-76
(noting the standing requirements developed by the federal judiciary are difficult to overcome).
64. Any time fraud is alleged as a predicate act, it must be pled particularly. FED. R. Ctv. P. 9.
However, some circuits have required all civil RICO complaints to be pled with particularity. See,
e.g., Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1438 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that pleading predicate acts with
conclusory allegations is of no consequence if they are unsupported by factual allegations); Lally v.
Crawford County Trust & Sav. Bank, 863 F.2d 612, 613 (8th Cir. 1988) (requiring a complaint to
contain specific facts supporting its conclusions in a debt collection case); Old Time Enter., Inc. v.
International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating a RICO plaintiff must plead
specific facts to establish an enterprise distinct from the corporation). One court explained the need
for all complaints to be pled particularly, not only fraud, as due to the statute's complexity. See
Jennings, 910 F.2d at 1435-36. Pleading with particularity helps the court or the opposing party
understand whether a valid claim has been alleged and if so, what the claim is. Id. at 1436.
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distinct from the racketeering activity. 65 Further, to establish the continuity requirement of a pattern, the plaintiff must show either a threat of
continued activity that may occur in the future (open ended continuity)
or related predicates extending over a substantial period of time (close
ended continuity).66

The Eighth Circuit has followed the trend of requiring carefully and
precisely pleaded RICO complaints. 6 7 The Eighth Circuit recognizes the
person-enterprise rule, which prevents the plaintiff from alleging that the
person named as the defendant also constitutes the enterprise. 6 8 Further,
the Eighth Circuit will require that the plaintiff show an enterprise based
on three things: (1) a common or shared purpose; (2) some continuity
of structure and personnel; and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct
from the pattern of racketeering. 69
5. Stating a Claim in State Courts
Although a framework interpreting the federal RICO statute has
developed in the federal court system, state courts are still left to interpret
certain aspects of their RICO statutes and may choose not to follow
federal precedent. 70 However, a look at jurisdictions with statutes very
similar to North Dakota's illustrates that even when there is no explicit
reliance on federal precedent, state courts tend to follow the pattern set
out by the Supreme Court decisions.7 1 More commonly, state courts
65. See Jennings, 910 F.2d at 1440. The court in Jennings explained an enterprise as an ongoing
structure of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner allowing
for consensual decision making. Id. The enterprise must be distinct and separate from the pattern of
racketeering activity; the pattern of racketeering may be the means through which the enterprise
interacts with society, but it is not the enterprise itself. Id. Rather "an enterprise is defined by what it
is, not what it does." Id.
66. A pattern of racketeering activity arises when there is continuity plus relationship in the
predicate acts. Lange v. Hocker, 940 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1991). Continuity can be shown either
by closed ended continuity or open ended continuity. Id.
67. See Lally, 863 F.2d at 613 (requiring a RICO litigant to allege time, place, and content of the
misrepresentations the action is based on); see also Federal Land Bank v. Gibbs, 809 F.2d 493, 496
(8th Cir. 1987) (finding dismissal proper when a complaint is vague and conclusory).
68. Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. Dicon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 1989).
69. Id.
70. See Tonnemacher v. Sasak, 859 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (D. Ariz. 1994) (noting that Arizona
state courts had declined to follow the developing federal precedent requiring a separate racketeering
injury when it was still an issue in the federal circuits).
71. For example, Nevada state courts have acknowledged that their state statute is not identical to
the federal statute, and thus have sought to answer the questions of a prior criminal conviction and
separate racketeering injury independently of federal law. See Hale v. Burkhardt, 764 P.2d 866, 868
(Nev. 1988). Their results, nonetheless, mirrored those of the Supreme Court. See id. (holding that
there is no requirement under Nevada law for a plaintiff to allege a separate racketeering injury and
likewise no requirement that predicate acts be shown by a prior conviction). Similarly, Idaho has
required that a plaintiff allege a pattern of racketeering activity by showing the predicate acts
constitute a threat of continuing activity without relying on federal precedent. Spence v. Howell, 890
P.2d 714, 726 (Idaho 1995) (citing the Idaho RICO statute and Idaho case law). The court did not
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specifically state their intention to look to the federal courts in
72
interpreting their own RICO statutes.
B. CIVIL RICO INNORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota adopted its RICO statute in 1983. 7 3 The law was
based on an Arizona statute, which in turn was patterned after the federal
law. 74 North Dakota's RICO statute, like many other similar state
statutes, 75 contains a civil component that allows for those injured by a
76
pattern of racketeering activity to recover treble damages and costs.
The North Dakota legislature amended the statute twice, bringing the
77
statute even closer in form to the federal RICO statute.
The North Dakota RICO statute allows for a plaintiff to recover in
two ways: first, if a plaintiff sustains "injury" because of a "pattern of
racketeering;" and second, if a plaintiff is injured when a person,
through a pattern of racketeering, "acquires . . . control of any enterprise." 7 8 A "pattern of racketeering" requires at least two predicate

acts, one occurring after July 8, 1987, and the last occurring within ten
years after commission of the first predicate act. 7 9 Predicate acts can be
articulate the second part of the federal test, however, requiring relatedness. Id.; see also H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (requiring continuity plus relationship).
72. See Rosier v. First Nat'l Fin. Capital Corp., 889 P.2d I1, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
since the Arizona statute is patterned after the federal RICO statute, the legislature must have intended
that the two should have similar proximate cause pleading requirements); New Crawford Valley, Ltd.
v. Benedict, 877 P.2d 1363, 1370-71 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that if Colorado adopts a statute
from another jurisdiction, then cases interpreting that statute are presumptive of legislative intent).
73. Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, ch. 163, 1983 N.D. Laws 422-32.
Initial proponents of the legislation pointed out that it would hit the crooks where it hurt-their
pocketbooks. RICO: Hearings on SB 2402 before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th Legis. (N.D.
1983) (statement of John Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General). Opposition to the Act focused mainly
on its sweeping scope coupled with the feeling that laws already existed to deal with such problems.
Id. (statements of Representative Gates and Meiers).
74. RICO: Hearings on SB 2402 before the House Judiciary Comm., 48th Legis. 2005 (N.D.
1983) (statement of Senator Christensen); RICO: Hearingson SB 2402 Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 48th Legis. I (N.D. 1983) (statement of Chief of Police). The Arizona statute was amended in
1993 and no longer parallels North Dakota's statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (West
Supp. 1995) (listing the prior language of the statute in the historical and statutory notes section). The
Arizona statute changed from allowing an individual to bring suit to allowing for the attorney general
or county attorney to file an action on behalf of the person injured. Id.
75. See supra note 23 (citing other state RICO statutes).
76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-05 (1) (Supp. 1995). The statute also allows for recovery if
there is a violation of section 12.1-06.1-03, which criminalizes controlling an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. See §§ 12.1-06.1-05, -03.
77. The 1987 amendments began as an attempt to repeal the statute, but resulted instead in
bringing the statute more in line with the federal statute by requiring two predicate acts within 10
years. RICO: Hearings on SB 2449 before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis. I (N.D. 1987)
(statement of Tom Kelsch, representing the North Dakota Banker's Association). Again, the statute
remained little used and was superficially amended further in 1995. Racketeer Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act, ch. 124, 1995 N.D. Laws 414. The 1995 amendments were part of the resulting
legislation promulgated by the Juvenile Justice Task Force and among other small changes, replaced
the words "criminal syndicate" with "criminal association." Id. at 415-18.
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-05, -03.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d) (Supp. 1995).
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any of a laundry list of acts, including conspiracy and attempt,
chargeable under the laws of the state in which the act occurred. 80 An
enterprise is "any corporation, limited liability company, association,
labor union, or other legal entity or any group of persons associated in
fact although not a legal entity." 8 1 Control is defined as "the
possession of a sufficient interest to permit substantial direction over the
affairs of an enterprise." 82 The statute requires the civil action to be
brought within seven years of discovery of the violation. 83 The standard
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 84
Prior to Rolin Manufacturing, only the Federal District Court for the
District of North Dakota had interpreted the North Dakota RICO
statute. 85 In Meyer v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,86 the plaintiff
alleged both federal and state RICO claims. 87 The federal district court
found that since the complaint stated a claim under the federal statute, it
80. Id. The full text defining predicate acts states:
"Racketeering" means any act including any criminal attempt, facilitation, solicitation, or
conspiracy, committed for financial gain, which is chargeable or indictable under the
laws of the state in which the Act occurred and, if the act occurred in a state other than
this state, would be chargeable or indictable under the laws of this state had the act
occurred in this state and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, regardless
of whether such act is charged or indicted, involving:
(1) Homicide.
(2) Robbery.
(3) Kidnapping.
(4) Forgery.
(5) Theft.
(6) Bribery.
(7) Gambling.
(8) Usury.
(9) Extortion.
(10) Unlawful delivery of controlled substances.
(11)
Trafficking in explosives, weapons, or stolen property.
(12) Leading a criminal association.
(13) Obstructing or hindering criminal investigations or prosecutions.
(14) Asserting false claims including, but not limited to, false claims
asserted though fraud or arson.
(15)
Fraud.
(16) Sale of unregistered securities or real property securities and
transactions involving such securities by unregistered dealers or
salesmen.
(17) Obscenity.
(18)
Child Pornography.
(19) Prostitution.
Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
See id. § 12.1-06.1-05(7).
Id. § 12.1-06.1-05(9).
See Meyer v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 698 F. Supp. 798, 800 (D.N.D. 1987).
698 F. Supp. 798 (D.N.D. 1987).
Meyer v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 698 F. Supp. 798, 800 (D.N.D. 1987).
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similarly was sufficient to state a claim under the state statute. 88 While
persuasive, the court in Meyer applied federal law to get to its conclusion,
thus the North Dakota statute remained unadjudicated until Rolin
89
Manufacturing.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In deciding whether Rolin Manufacturing had stated a claim against
either Mosbrucker or the Bank under North Dakota's RICO statute, the
court began by setting out the relevant statutory definitions of control,
enterprise, and racketeering. 90 Next, the court determined that plaintiffs
must show that their damages were proximately caused by the defendant's violation of a predicate RICO act. 9 1 The court stated a RICO
claim must be pled with the same particularity as a fraud claim and noted
pleading with particularity means giving the dates, times, and places of
the fraudulent statements. 92
The court next stated that predicate acts must be criminal acts,
as shown either by a prior conviction or through probable cause. 9 3 The
court explained further that every RICO claim must have an element
of criminal activity and noted that the defendant's state of mind in a
civil RICO action must be the same as that required in a criminal
88. Id. at 809. In finding that a federal claim had been stated, the court decided the plaintiff had
alleged facts with the required particularity to establish a fraud violation. Id. at 802. Plaintiff also had
standing based on allegations that the plaintiffs injuries had resulted from defendant's commission of
a predicate act. Id. at 802, 803. Additionally, the plaintiff was required to allege a pattern of activity
as shown by at least two predicate acts that were related and continued activity. Id. at 805. Finally,
the court rejected a requirement of probable cause as being necessary for pleading the predicate acts.
Id. at 807.
89. See id. at 809.
90. Rolin Mfg., Inc. v. Mosbrucker, 544 N.W.2d 132, 137-38 (N.D. 1996).
91. Id. at 138 (quoting from Rosier v. First Fin. Capital Corp., 889 P.2d I1, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994)). The court relied on an Arizona case discussing the proximate cause requirement set out in
Holmes v. Securities Investors Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992). The Arizona court held that
because the Arizona RICO statute was patterned after the federal RICO statute, the Arizona
legislature intended the state RICO statute to contain a proximate cause requirement as well. Rosier v.
First Fin. Capital Corp., 889 P.2d 11, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
92. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting David G. Duggan, Pleadinga RICO Claim, 78 ILL. B.
J. 454, 457 (1990)). In the quotation used by the court, Duggan explained what to plead when the
predicate acts arise out of the federal crimes of mail fraud, wire fraud, or fraud in the sale of
securities. David G. Duggan, Pleadinga RICO Claim, 78 ILL. B. J. 454, 457 (1990).
93. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667,
682-83 (N.D. Ga. 1983)). The Taylor case requires either a prior conviction or probable cause in
establishing the predicate acts. Taylor, 572 F. Supp. at 682-83. However, two years later in Sedima,
the Supreme Court ruled that it is not necessary to have a prior conviction to establish a predicate act.
Sedima v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985). In dicta, the Supreme Court further held that it is not
necessary to establish the predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt, but the Court did not decide the
standard of proof required. Id. at 491. It is clear that half of the court's decision in Taylor was overruled; it is not necessary to have a conviction to establish a predicate act. Id. at 492.
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prosecution. 9 4 The court ended its discussion of the applicable law by
noting that a pattern of racketeering activity requires proof of two
related predicate criminal acts. 95
In applying this law, the court noted that Rolin Manufacturing's
complaint did not plead dates, times, or places of the fraudulent statements. 96 The complaint characterized events as criminal, but failed to
allege any convictions or probable cause related to the alleged criminal
acts. 97 The court also looked at the fact that the complaint did not allege
any crime by the Bank. 9 8 The court concluded by stating that the complaint failed to plead criminal activity with the particularity required for
a RICO claim and thus failed to state a claim. 9 9
IV. IMPACT
Rolin Manufacturing gave North Dakota's court its first chance to
interpret the North Dakota civil RICO statute. Rather than explaining
how a plaintiff could prevail and recover treble damages and attorneys'
fees, the case ruled on the narrower, albeit crucial, question of what is
required to state a claim. In finding that no RICO claim had been stated,
and upholding sanctions against Rolin Manufacturing for a frivolous
pleading, the court indicated it will follow other courts in holding plaintiffs to strict pleading requirements. 100 Rolin Manufacturing's precise
impact is yet to be seen, and while it may give plaintiffs an advantage, it
will leave both parties questioning where the court will look for
precedent in interpreting the statute.
After Rolin Manufacturing, a plaintiff must plead a RICO claim with
particularity and must base the alleged predicate acts on either probable
cause or a prior conviction.l 0 1 Though an action based on fraud is
always required to be pled with particularity,1 0 2 holding that all RICO
94. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 687 F. Supp. 255,
258 (E.D. La. 1988)).
95. Id. (quoting Stiller v. Sumter Bank & Trust Co., 860 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Ga. 1994)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Spalding, supra note 63, at 75. Sanctions are mandatory only in the limited instance
where a party has no reasonable expectation of prevailing. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01 (1987).
Sanctions are not usually applied to new areas of law because it is more likely that a party could
reasonably expect to prevail. See Soentgen.v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73, 85-6 (N.D.
1991). It is surprising that here the court was not more lenient because RICO law is unclear and has
never been applied by this court.
101. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138.
102. N.D. R. Civ. P. 9. The reason given for requiring fraud to be pled particularly is to give the
defendant enough information to respond to and defend the charge. See Miller Enter., Inc. v. Dog N'
Cat Pet Ctr. of Am., 447 N.W.2d 639, 643 (N.D. 1989). This reasoning translates to requiring the same
particularity in RICO-to apprise the defendant of what he or she must prepare to defend.
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claims likewise must be pled with particularity requires more from a
plaintiff than a "short and plain statement" that would normally suffice
in a civil pleading.1 03 Not only must the plaintiff plead with particularity, but the alleged predicate acts must be based on probable cause or
104
a prior conviction.
Defendants are only somewhat protected from the sting of a civil
RICO action by these heightened pleading requirements. Plaintiffs have
a slight advantage since conviction of the defendant on a predicate act
would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but a plaintiff could
still prevail on a RICO claim should the plaintiff be able to plead the
predicate acts to the lesser standard of probable cause. 105 Thus, while
plaintiffs may fear the strict pleading requirements, a RICO claim may
allow civil recovery where the evidence is too weak to provide a criminal
conviction.
In addition to deciding RICO's pleading requirements, the court
creates questions as to where it will turn for precedent in interpreting the
statute in the future. The authority relied on by the court in Rolin Manufacturing is all directly or indirectly based on interpretation of the
federal RICO statute. 106 This implies that the court will rely on federal
precedent in interpreting the North Dakota statute, but unlike other
courts, there is no explicit statement of this intent. 107 To further
complicate matters, the court followed federal precedent when it required
a showing of proximate cause, 108 but rejected federal precedent in requiring a prior conviction or probable cause to establish a predicate act. 109
In requiring a prior conviction or probable cause, the court cited a
Georgia federal district court case decided in 1983, two years before the
Supreme Court interpreted RICO as not requiring a prior conviction to
103. N.D. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(i).
104. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138.
105. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01 (Supp. 1995) (stating that racketeering will mean any
act chargeable or indictable regardless of whether the act is charged or indicted).
106. See Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138; see also Stiller v. Sumter Bank & Trust Co., 860 F. Supp.
835, 836 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (interpreting the federal RICO statute); Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 687
F. Supp. 255, 256 (E.D. La. 1988) (interpreting the federal RICO statute); Taylor v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 680 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (interpreting the federal RICO statute); Rosier v. First Fin.
Capital Corp., 889 P.2d I1, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting the state RICO statute by looking to
federal law for guidance); Duggan, supra note 92 (explaining how to plead a federal RICO violation).
107. E.g., Grove Holding v. First Wis. Nat. Bank, 803 F. Supp. 1486, 1503 (E.D. Wis. 1992)
(stating that requirements under the federal law will apply unless the legislature has expressly chosen
an alternative); Schnitzer v. Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F. Supp. 92, 99 (D. Or. 1985) (stating an intent to
interpret Oregon's statute in the same way the federal statute is interpreted); Rosier, 889 P.2d at 15
(stating because Arizona's statute so closely resembles the federal statute, the legislature intended to it
to have similar requirements).
108. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138. The proximate cause requirement was taken from Rosier,
which adopted it after discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Holmes. Rosier, 889 P.2d at 14
(citing Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992)).
109. Rolin Mfg., 544 N.W.2d at 138.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 73:741

establish a predicate act."l 0 In choosing to rely on the 1983 Georgia
case, the court rejected a precedent that has since clearly been settled in
federal law. III
The court also hinted at how it will define a pattern by stating,
"[t]he pattern of racketeering activity requires proof of two related predicate criminal acts."112 The United States Supreme Court has defined
pattern as conduct satisfying the two pronged test of relatedness and
continuity."1 3 However, in its choice of authority, the North Dakota
Supreme Court only extracted the first half of this test, even though the
case cited went on to apply both prongs of the test. 114 The court's
truncation of the pattern test may indicate an intention to only require
relatedness in establishing a pattern, rather than the more common
approach of requiring both continuity and relatedness.
As a result of their choice of precedent, the court makes it hard to
predict where the court will look for guidance in interpreting North
Dakota's law. Choosing an old case that has since been modified by a
Supreme Court ruling and selecting half of a two prong test suggests that
the court intends to start afresh in interpreting the North Dakota statute,
rather than relying on the law as developed in other jurisdictions.
Holding a plaintiff to strict pleading requirements and upholding Rule
11 sanctions further implies that the court may be attempting to limit the
availability of civil RICO claims. Though the potential for recovering
treble damages is very appealing, plaintiffs must first grapple with Rolin
Manufacturing.
Alana DeKrey

110. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (explaining that no prior conviction is
necessary). The Court refused to decide on the standard of proof required, but in dicta said it was not
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 491.
111. See id. at 489.
112. Id.
113. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
114. See Stiller v. Sumter Bank & Trust Co., 860 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Ga. 1994).

